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Aviation Law-FLORIDA'S "ANTITECHNICAL" STATUTE: SHOULD
INSURANCE EXCLUSIONS BE INCLUDED?-Pickett v. Woods, 404 So.
2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
One of the most frequently litigated issues in aviation insurance
cases is the application of policy exclusions.1 Commonly used air-
craft policy exclusions are those which provide for no coverage
when specific Federal Aviation Administration regulations are vio-
lated,2 such as failing to have a valid pilot's certificate or airworthi-
ness certificate.8 Once such an exclusion is raised as valid and its
violation is proved by the insurer,' it has been well-established law
in Florida and most other jurisdictions that no causal connection
need be shown between the violation and the actual loss. 5 In other
words, if a policy states clearly and unambiguously that coverage
will be excluded when the pilot is not carrying a valid pilot's certif-
icate, that policy will not provide insurance for the pilot with an
expired license, even though the crash was caused entirely by cir-
1. Hagglund and Arthur, Coverage Problems in Aviation Insurance Policies, FED'N OF
INS. COUNS. Q., Summer, 1973, 4, 22-23; Jericho, Insurance Coverage Violations, 1974 SMALL
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT LITIGATION, PHASE II 246, 250.
2. 12 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 44A:105; Insurance (2d ed. 1981); 11
COUCH § 42:630; Hagglund and Arthur, supra note 1, at 24; see SPEISER, KRAUSE AND GANS,
AVIATION TORT LAW § 23:5 (1980) for examples of many types of aviation policy exclusions.
3. According to Federal Aviation Administration Regulations, "[s]tandard airworthiness
certificates ... are effective as long as the maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alter-
ations are performed in accordance with Parts 43 and 91 of this chapter. ... 14 C.F.R. §
21.181(a)(1) (1982).
While Part 43 details the content of such required maintenance, Part 91 states: "[N]o
person may operate an aircraft unless, within the preceding 12 calendar months, it has
had-(1) An annual inspection in accordance with Part 43 of this chapter. ... 14 C.F.R. §
91.169 (1981).
4. Davis, Aviation Insurance Policy Problems, 1974 SMALL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT LITIGA-
TION 46, 51; 12 COUCH at § 44A:10.
5. Hagglund and Arthur, supra note 1, at 9, 45.
The lack of need to show a causal connection between the loss and the breach of an
exclusion is a well-established principle of general insurance law. See Myers v. Ocean Acci-
dent & Guar. Corp., 99 F.2d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 1938). For Justice Cardozo's explanation of
the principle, see Travelers Ass'n. v. Prinsen, 291 U.S. 576, 581 (1934).
For cases applying the principle to aviation insurance law, see Bill Hames Shows, Inc. v.
J.J. Taylor Syndicate #173, 642 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1981); Hollywood Flying Service, Inc. v.
Compass Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1979); Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119
(6th Cir. 1969); Electron Machine Corp. v. American Mercury Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 212 (5th
Cir. 1961); Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Cordova Airlines, Inc., 283 F.2d 659 (9th
Cir. 1960); Lineas Aereas Colombianas Expresas v. The Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 257 F.2d
150, 156 (5th Cir. 1958); Bruce v. Lumbermans Mutual Casualty Co., 222 F.2d 642 (4th Cir.
1955); Glades Flying Club v. Americas Aviation & Marine Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1970); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., .204 N.W.2d 162
(Neb. 1973); Baker v. Insurance Co. N.Am., 179 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); Ochs v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 636 P.2d 421 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). But see South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Col-
lins, 237 S.E. 2d 358 (S.C. 1977), wherein the above cases are cited and expressly rejected.
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cumstances unrelated to licensing, such as flight into unexpected
adverse weather.
Policy warranties, representations and conditions are different
from exclusions. Due to the existence in most states of "antitechni-
cal" or "misrepresentation" statutes, the mere breach of a war-
ranty, representation or condition will not allow denial of coverage
as would, a mere breach of an exclusion.6 Instead, the breach must
be more substantial." Exactly what type of breach will justify
avoidance of the policy is normally set out in the statute. The stan-
dard varies slightly from state to state.8
To fully appreciate why exclusions are treated differently from
warranties, representations and conditions, an exploration of ter-
minology and historical background is needed. A representation is
a statement made by an insured to an insurer prior to formation of
the insurance contract, upon which the insurer bases its decision to
accept or reject the risk.9 Warranties and conditions, on the other
hand, become part of the insurance contract itself. A warranty is a
statement made by the insured, promising "the existence of certain
facts, . . . the literal truth of which is essential to the validity of
the contract. . . ."1 A condition-which may be either a condition
precedent or subsequent-calls for either "the happening of some
event. . . after the terms of the contract have been agreed upon,
[but] before the contract shall be binding," or the avoidance or
suspension of the policy "upon the happening of some event."'"
Thus, the insured's statement that he is the holder of a valid
pilot's license, prior to the drafting of the policy, is a representa-
tion. A statement contained within the policy that the insured will
not fly the aircraft without holding a valid pilot's license is com-
monly expressed as a warranty. A policy provision that "this policy
shall become void if the insured's pilot's license expires or other-
wise becomes invalid" is a condition. In any of these three cases,
the policy has the potential to be voided, but is not unless a repre-
sentation was false or a condition or warranty breached.12
6. Misrepresentations and Nondisclosures in the Insurance Application, 13 GA. L. REv.
876, 879 (1979); 7 COUCH, § 35:14;3 LONG, THE LAW OF LiAnLrrY INSURANCE § 19.02, n. 3
(1981) (hereinafter referred to as LONG].
7. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
8. 7 COUCH § 35:17.
9. 30 FLA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 567 (1981); 43 Am. JUR. 2D Insurance § 734 (1969); 7
COUCH 2d, § 35.2.
10. 7 CoucH § 35.2.
11. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 755 (1969).
12. LONG supra note 6 § 17.15.
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An exclusion, on the other hand, provides that a certain risk or
situation will not be covered by the policy. 3 Instead of creating the
potential for the policy to be voided, it specifically limits the risks
covered by creating a present exception with respect to the ex-
cluded activity. Thus, a statement in a policy that "this policy does
not apply to flight by any pilot with an invalid pilot's license" is an
exclusion.
The terms "warranties" and "conditions" have often been used
interchangeably by courts,'4 and the two terms also have some-
times been confused with representations. However, it is important
to place the proper label-condition, warranty or representa-
tion-on a policy statement. While a misrepresentation would not
render a policy void unless the statement was substantially false,
warranties and conditions had to be strictly complied with. The
slightest breach of a warranty or condition would result in a com-
plete avoidance of coverage by the insurer.' 5
Naturally, the different effects of an insured's misrepresentation
versus his breach of a warranty or condition led to terminology
battles and to confused case law. An insurer might strive to inter-
pret a questionable statement as a warranty or condition, so that
even a slight breach would allow avoidance of coverage. An in-
sured, on the other hand, would label the same statement a mis-
representation, so that only substantial falsity would allow avoid-
ance. An unscrupulous insurer could fill a policy with unimportant
statements labeled "warranties", making it all but impossible to
recover after some slight breach.'-
In order to protect the insured, states began to enact "an-
titechnical" or "misrepresentation" statutes. 7 The statutes' names
accurately described their purpose: to remove the insurer's ability
to escape coverage by using a purely technical defense. This was
accomplished by treating the condition or warranty as though it
were a representation. 18 These statutes provided that warranties
and conditions, as well as representations, would have to meet cer-
tain criteria in order to defeat a claim.' 9 Although different states
have different forms of statutes, most are worded so that a breach
13. 7 CoucH supra note 2 § 36.48; LONG supra note 6 § 17.15.
14. 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 473 (4) (1956); 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 756 (1969).
15. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 747 (1969).
16. 13 GA. L. REV. at 878-79.
17. Id. at 879; 7 COUCH § 35.15.
18. 13 GA. L. REv. at 879; 7 COUCH §§ 35:15-17.
19. Id.
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or misrepresentation either must (1) be material, (2) increase
the risk, (3) be fraudulently made, or (4) contribute causally to
the loss.20
Florida's antitechnical statute was first enacted in 1959 and ap-
pears in Chapter 17 of the Insurance Code as follows:
627.409 Representations in applications; warranties.-
(1) All statements and descriptions in any application for an
insurance policy or annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor,
by or in behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be
representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations, omis-
sions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not
prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless either:
(a) Fraudulent; or
(b) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to
the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(c) The insurer in good faith would either not have is-
sued the policy or contract, or would not have issued it at
the same premium rate, or would not have issued a policy or
contract in as large an amount, or would not have provided
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if
the true facts had been made known to the insurer as re-
quired either by the application for the policy or contract or
otherwise.
(2) A breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, con-
dition, or provision of any wet marine or transportation insurance
policy, contract of insurance, endorsement, or application therefor
shall not render void the policy or contract, or constitute a de-
fense to a loss thereon, unless such breach or violation increased
the hazard by any means within the control of the insured.2
Due to the widespread existence of antitechnical statutes, the
law with regard to warranties, representations and conditions is
now by and large statutorily defined. Antitechnical statutes have
not, however, applied to exclusions.2 2 Therefore, although at least
two states disagree,2s the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
20. 7 COUCH 35:17, 35:44.
21. FLA. STAT. § 627.409 (1981).
22. 7 COUCH § 35:33; LONG § 19.02, n.3.
23. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Miss. 1960), aff'd
on other grounds, 289 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1961) and South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237
S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1977). The two cases are based on, respectively, well-settled Mississippi
and South Carolina law.
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state that no causal connection need be established between a pol-
icy exclusion and a loss.2 4 An insurer may lawfully limit its liability
through the use of exclusions and, as long as the exclusion is stated
clearly and unambiguously, it will be valid.25
Until recently, the Florida law with regard to exclusions was in
accordance with the above-stated principles. A long line of Florida
and Fifth Circuit case law existed, firmly establishing that insurers
need not show a causal connection.26 In October, 1981, Pickett v.
Woods 27 changed existing law. By interpreting Florida's antitechni-
cal statute to apply equally to representations, warranties, condi-
tions, and exclusions,28 the court has forced Florida insurers to
show that breach of an exclusion has "increased the hazard. ' 29
Otherwise, the exclusion will have no effect.
On October 6, 1974, Dr. Wilbur C. Pickett was to return by com-
mercial airline to Daytona Beach from a golfing trip in North Car-
olina.30 Instead, he accepted a ride home in a friend's Cessna 310
and played nine more holes of golf. Just north of Orlando, the non-
instrument-rated pilot encountered rapidly worsening weather.
While attempting to land in instrument conditions, the 310
crashed, killing Dr. Pickett, the pilot and both of the other
passengers.-1
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) investigation re-
vealed that the plane was flying with an expired airworthiness cer-
tificate. The Cessna had had its last annual inspection approxi-
mately fifteen months prior to the crash and not within the past
twelve months, as required.32 The FAA concluded, however, that
the expired certificate in no way contributed to the crash. The sole
cause was said to be pilot error.3 3
Dr. Pickett's wife brought suit in the Circuit Court for Orange
County, Florida, naming as defendants the plane's owner, the pilot,
and the Foremost Insurance Company.3 4 Foremost denied coverage
24. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
25. LONG § 17.15.
26. 642 F.2d 179; 597 F.2d 507; 297 F.2d 212; 257 F.2d 150; 235 So. 2d 18.
27. 404 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
28. Id. at 1153.
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.409(2) (1981).
30. Initial Brief of Appellants at 5 [hereinafter referred to as Brief].
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5, 6. See supra note 3.
33. Brief at 6.
34. Id. at 2; 404 So. 2d at 1152.
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for the owner and pilot35 due to the existence of an exclusion in the
policy:
"This policy does not apply:
4. to any insured
(b) who operates or permits the operation of the aircraft,
while in flight, unless its airworthiness certificate is in full
force and effect ... "36
After the case had been scheduled for trial, Foremost moved to
sever the issue of insurance coverage for separate consideration.
The motion ultimately was granted and the insurance company
waived all coverage issues except the issue of whether the airwor-
thiness certificate was in effect at the time of the crash. This issue
alone was presented to the jury and, upon its finding that the air-
worthiness certificate was not in effect at the time of the crash,
final judgment was entered in favor of Foremost."
Mrs. Pickett immediately filed notice of appeal and, in her ini-
tial brief, attacked the trial court's judgment from a new perspec-
tive. Her main argument was that "the trial court erred in denying
plaintiff's motion for directed verdict in regard to the insurance
coverage issue based upon the lack of causal connection between
the cause of the crash and the failure to have an annual inspection
performed on the aircraft within the twelve months preceding the
crash." 8
In support of her argument that a causal connection must be
established between the crash and the violation of the exclusion,
Mrs. Pickett reasoned as follows: First, Appleman's Insurance Law
and Practice states, "since the courts look with disfavor upon for-
feiture, the trend of modern authority is to hold that there is no
forfeiture if the breach of condition or warranty did not contribute
to a loss or did not increase the risk at the time of the loss;""9
second, she cited several cases from South Carolina, Nebraska,
Ohio, North Carolina, Texas and Washington (dating from 1916 to
1947) as examples of this "growing trend";40 she then explained
35. Brief at 2.
36. 404 So. 2d at 1152.
37. Brief at 4.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. (quoting 6A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4146 (1972)) (emphasis
added).
40. Brief at 11, 12 (citing Johnson & Stroud v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 90 S.E. 124 (N.C.
1916); Slafter v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 5 N.W.2d 217 (Neb. 1942); Northern Ins. Co.
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that the basis for all the cited cases was the existence in each state
of an "antitechnical" statute; 4' finally, since Florida, too, had en-
acted such a statute, and since the 310's failure to have a current
airworthiness certificate in no way caused or contributed to the
crash or increased the hazard (as the statute would require), appel-
lants concluded that "there was no evidence upon which the jury
could have lawfully returned the verdict it did and recovery to
Mrs. Pickett. . .should not be denied.""2 Foremost, in its answer,
pointed to the long and unwavering line of Florida and Fifth Cir-
cuit cases, clearly establishing that no causal relationship need be
shown in instances where a policy exclusion has been "violated. 4 3
The District Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the argu-
ment that the statute should apply and decided to disregard the
long and unwavering line. The trial court's decision was reversed
and the case was remanded to determine whether the invalid air-
worthiness certificate in any way increased the hazard in accor-
dance with section 627.409(2), Florida Statutes (1979)."
In reaching its decision, the court noted that the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bill Hames Shows, Inc. v. J.J.
Taylor Syndicate #173 had recently-only six months prior to
Pickett-reemphasized Florida's position that exclusions were
valid regardless of causal connection.45 Hames, the court noted,
was based on Glades Flying Club-a 1970 case.'6 Since Glades was
decided prior to the 1971 enactment of section 627.409(2), the
Pickett court concluded, neither case should now control.'
The court also recognized that section 627.409(2) speaks specifi-
cally of warranties, conditions and provisions-whereas the Pickett
case involved an exclusion. "However," the court stated, "we be-
lieve that whether a policy warranty, condition or exclusion is in-
volved is not determinative. The Legislature apparently recognized
the difficulty courts and insurance companies have had in distin-
guishing between these terms and used the word 'provision' which
v. Morris, 165 N.E. 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929); South Carolina Ins. Co. v Collins, 237 S.E. 2d
358 (S.C. 1977); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 202 S.W. 2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
McGillicuddy v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 217 P. 1000 (Wash. 1923)).
41. Brief at 12.
42. Brief at 15, 16.
43. Answer Brief of Appellee at 2, 3.
44. 404 So. 2d at 1153.
45. 642 F.2d 179.
46. 235 So. 2d at 18.
47. 404 So. 2d at 1153.
1983]
744 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:737
would include any material portion of the policy.""8
Although the court's opinion fails to discuss the rationale behind
its interpretation of section 627.409(2), it evidently employed a
well-founded rule of statutory interpretation-ejusdem generis.
The rule provides that where a general word follows a list of spe-
cific words, the general word will be construed to include any ob-
jects in the class of objects described by the specific words."9 Thus,
the word "provision" was interpreted to include exclusions, as well
as warranties and conditions.
It is beyond the scope of this case note to explore in depth the
rules of statutory interpretation or to suggest that the court was
incorrect in its analysis of the statute. It will be suggested, how-
ever, that policy considerations may support the rewording of the
statute by the legislature so as not to allow the interpretation given
it by the Pickett court.
The Massachusetts case of United States Aviation Underwrit-
ers, Inc. v. Rex Ray Corp.50 involved an exclusion in an aircraft
policy and gave the superior court its first chance to decide
whether a causal connection would be required. In making its deci-
sion not to require a causal connection with regard to exclusions,
the court weighed both sides of the issue and stated:
Given the technical meaning of an exclusion as a clause defining a
risk which is not covered, there would appear to be no logical
reason why a causal connection should be required .... It does
appear . . . that the trend of modern authority is to hold that
there is no forfeiture if the breach of condition or warranty did
not contribute to the loss. Appleman, supra, § 4146. [However],
in the absence of some authority equating exclusions and condi-
tions, the court sees no basis for adopting the South Carolina
precedent. Generally, an insurance company has the right not to
contract for certain risks . . . and on the record as it now stands,
there is no reason why the contract should not be given effect as
written. 1
Likewise, in Ochs v. Avemco Insurance Company,52 the Oregon
Court of Appeals dealt for the first time with the issue of whether
48. Id.
49. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234 (1975); 2A J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1973).
50. 15 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 17,625 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1979).
51. Id. at V1 17,630 (emphasis added).
52. 636 P.2d 421 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
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causal connection should be required. It too took notice of South
Carolina but ultimately decided that "[t]here is contrary authority
which we consider to be the better reasoned. '53 Ironically, the
court cites three Florida cases in support of its "better reasoned"
authority.5 In conclusion, the court states:
'[W]e must also remember that it is the fundamental right of the
insurer to decide what it will and what it will not insure against,
providing that the provision is not against public policy.'. . . We
believe the better rule is that the insurer is entitled to exclude
any liability for aircraft not bearing a valid and current airworthi-
ness certificate. We hold that proof of causal connection between
the cause of the accident and the policy exclusion is not
required. 5
Two other cases address the Louisiana and Nebraska antitechni-
cal statutes from the view of whether exclusions were meant to be
included. Both decided the question in the negative. In Omaha
Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co.," the
scope of Nebraska's antitechnical statute was defined. An exclusion
in an aircraft policy provided that the policy would not cover the
aircraft while it was operated by a pilot not holding valid pilot and
medical certificates. Plaintiff's medical certificate had been expired
for five months at the time of the crash, so his action against the
insurer was dismissed.5 7 In affirming the trial court's decision, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the policy's exclusion "did not
constitute either a 'warranty' or a 'condition' within the meaning
of Nebraska's antitechnical statute."5 The statute provides that
"[tihe breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy
of insurance shall not avoid the policy. . . unless such breach shall
exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the loss."" Thus, the
statute had no application to the exclusion and the rule that no
causal connection is needed was applied.
As a policy reason, the court stated that it is well established
53. Id. at 423.
54. Id. at 423-24, citing Hollywood Flying Service v. Compass Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1979); Electron Machine Corp. v. American Mercury Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1961). Glades Flying Club v. Americas Aviation & Marine Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1970).
55. 636 P.2d at 424.
56. 204 N.W.2d 162 (Neb. 1973).
57. Id. at 163-64.
58. Id. at 164.
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (1943).
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that aircraft insurance policies may contain exclusions. Further-
more, it said, "[t]he insurer under an aircraft insurance policy may
lawfully exclude certain risks from the coverage of its policy and
where damage occurs during the operation of the insured aircraft
under circumstances as to which the policy excludes coverage,
there is no coverage." 60
Benton Casing Service, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance Co.6 1 dealt
with a similar application of Louisiana's antitechnical statute to an
exclusion contained in an aircraft insurance policy. After a schol-
arly discussion of the differences between warranties, conditions,
representations and exclusions, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the court of appeal had erred in applying the Louisianna stat-
ute to exclusions.6 ' Louisiana's antitechnical statute speaks specifi-
cally of warranties, representations and conditions, but not of ex-
clusions.6 8 As the rationale for its decision, the court expressed a
view that insurance companies should have a right to limit cover-
age in any manner they choose, so long as those limitations were
not in conflict with statutes or public policy. Furthermore, it
stated, the provision at issue did not conflict with public policy.
"[B]ecause of the enormous risk inherent in the improper opera-
tion of an aircraft, the insurer has a legitimate interest in knowing
precisely who will be operating the insured aircraft in order that it
may evaluate the qualifications of the proposed pilots and exclude
risks which it will not insure."' The court also said, "[t]he addi-
tion of a pilot to the policy . . . could increase the risk and the
premium charged to the insured." 5
The statutes involved in the above cases did not address "provi-
sions" and thus could not have been as easily construed to apply to
exclusions as was the Florida statute in Pickett. The policy rea-
sons, however, apply with equal force to any argument that Flor-
ida's statute should not be so construed. The insurer has tradition-
ally been able to limit coverage by the use of exclusions so long as
public policy was not violated. The loss of that ability would place
burdens on insurers which would almost inevitably be passed on to
the insurance consumer by way of increased premiums.
One aviation insurance agent who was interviewed stated that
60. 204 N.W.2d at 164.
61. 379 So. 2d 225 (La. 1979).
62. Id. at 226-28 (discussing La. Rev. Stat. § 22-692).
63. Id. at 226.
64. Id. at 227.
65. Id. at 227-28.
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his agency has recently had to raise its policy rates 9 to 11 percent.
Although it is too early for accurate statistics, the agent speculated
that most of this increase was due to the insurer's anticipated bur-
den of proving "increase in hazard" with regard to exclusions.6
It is yet to be seen whether the application of Section 627.409(2)
to exclusions will render this type of aircraft policy exclusion inef-
fectual. This will depend on the difficulty insurers may have in
bearing the burden of proof that the "breach" of the exclusion "in-
creased the hazard" which caused the insured's loss. In some cases,
the burden may be easy to bear. For example, it would certainly be
arguable that an airworthiness certificate which had expired two
years earlier at least "increased the hazard" of a crash caused by a
cracked propellor or a broken fuel line. Likewise, a 60-year-old
male pilot's long overdue medical examination may have increased
the risk that he would crash after an unexpected heart attack.
However, in situations like the Pickett case, the insurer stands lit-
tle chance of proving the link required to effectuate its exclusion.
In such a case, the insurer may pay the insured for a set of circum-
stances which both parties had initially agreed would not be cov-
ered, and in reliance upon which the insured's rates were deter-
mined. As may already be apparent, the insurer will have no
option but to base rates on the expanded risk.17
As a further policy consideration, it is possible that standard air-
craft exclusions involving pilots' medical and airworthiness certifi-
cates have provided an incentive to the pilot/owner to keep such
certificates current and valid. The student pilot whose medical cer-
tificate has expired will be discovered when he or she flies with a
flight instructor. A pilot who does not own an aircraft will be
checked before being allowed to rent one from a commercial leas-
ing operation. An aircraft owner who leases aircraft for commercial
purposes will be periodically checked to see if his airworthiness
certificates are current. However, these controls do not exist for
the private aircraft owner. Private owners (who are insurance pur-
chasers) probably would never be caught with an expired certifi-
cate and may have nothing but the fear of an uninsured loss to
66. Telephone interview with James Hildebrand of Alexander & Alexander, Miami, Flor-
ida. (Nov. 29, 1982). This agency is located within the jurisdiction affected by the Pickett
decision, and the agent was well aware of the potential impact of the decision. See also,
supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also Benton Casing Service, Inc. v Avemo Ins. Co.
(advancing this policy concern), supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
67. Id.
19831
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provide the incentive to meet these requirements."
A third policy consideration stems from the traditional notion
that any ambiguity existing in an insurance policy will be con-
strued in the light most favorable to the insured.6e The reasoning
behind this notion is to protect the insured, who is not likely to be
as sophisticated and knowledgeable as the insurer. Thus,
lawmakers and courts strive to fashion statutes and case law which
will place both parties on a more equal footing. The imbalance be-
tween the aviation insured and the insurer, however, may be much
smaller than that imbalance found in other fields of insurance due
to the aircraft owner's greater background and large financial in-
vestment in the aircraft. The pilot who seeks to purchase insurance
for his aircraft has had extensive training in his aircraft. He has
passed oral, written, medical and practical (flying) examinations.
He has been reevaluated at least every two years,7 0 and throughout
the process has been constantly exposed to FAA regulations re-
garding pilot currency, training and aircraft maintenance. Further,
if he is an aircraft owner, a large portion of his flying expense con-
sists of an insurance payment. By going through the processes of
buying an aircraft, learning to fly it, maintaining it, and purchasing
insurance, the pilot/owner acquires a specialized knowledge which
may place him or her on a much more equal status with his insurer
than the average auto owner is with his automobile insurance com-
pany. There may well be a lesser need to protect the insured as an
unsophisticated, unsuspecting consumer. So long as the insured is
fully aware of the exclusion and public policy is not violated, exclu-
sions should be valid regardless of causal connection. The Massa-
chusetts court in United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Rex
Ray Corp.71 had such policy considerations in mind when it stated
that "an insurance company has the right not to contract for cer-
tain risks. . ., and. . . there is no reason why the contract should
68. According to 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(h), pilots are required to present their pilot and medi-
cal certificates for inspection upon the request of the FAA, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), or any federal, state, or local law enforcement officer. In reality, how-
ever, such requests rarely occur except in connection with the investigation of an incident or
accident.
69. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 45 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1950; Electron Mach. Corp. v.
American Mercury Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1961) (where there is no ambiguity, lan-
guage used will control).
70. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.103, 61.105 and 61.107, setting out the eligibility requirements,
aeronautical knowledge and flight proficiency necessary for obtaining a private pilot's li-
cense. 14 C.F.R. § 61.57 outlines the FAA's standards for recent flight experience and the
procedures for completion of the biennial flight review.
71. See supra note 50.
FLORIDA'S ANTITECHNICAL STATUTE
not be given effect as written."72
The courts of other states have faced these problems before
making their decisions. If the wording of this statute compels Flor-
ida courts to decide contrary to the majority of states, should not
the Florida legislature reconsider the language of the statute?
TRACIE S. BOONE
72. See supra note 52.
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